The tradition of moral inquiry into war is as old as war itself. Judgments about the rightness and wrongness of any given conflict extend from the motivations and intentions of die leaders who command to the soldiers on the ground, and involve political and military leaders, soldiers and civilians, within and outside the direct conflict. Just war theory draws on religious and secular sources to put forward sets of criteria which help us to explore the morality of immorality. Undergirding this tradition of moral inquiry are sets of assumptions about human rights, states' rights, responsibility, and, of course, justice. There is also an assumption that these notions cross national and cultural borders, and that they have value in as much as they do. There may be an additional assumption that they should, or that we should be able to agree on a set of principles which reflect these values and govern our behavior, the behavior of states, and the behavior of soldiers. This is not to say that all arguments in just war theory are unlversalistic. Many draw on particular beliefs and beliefstructures which are tradition-specific and require as a source or qualification of authority the acceptance of a myriad of metaphysical and religious beliefs.
One particularly interesting and possibly innovative example of the invocation of competing sources of authority as part of argumentation in the just war theory tradition comes from a group of Israeli reservists who recently (and unsuccessfully) argued in the Israeli High Court for the recognition of a right of selective conscientious objection to military service in tlie occupied territories.' There are a great number of rival religious, political, and secular allegiances which influence the arguments made to justify selective conscientious objection in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In Israel today, the only ai]guments which tend to succeed, and the only type of refusal recognized by the IDF, is conscientious objection based on religious grounds, or claims based on a thoroughgoing pacifistn -the secular alternative to religious conscientious objection. No claims of selective conscientious objection have been recognized (allowed) by the IDF, Judgments about the relative justice of a given conflict have failed to convince authorities to recognize such a right. A new line of argumentation in just war theory has emerged which uses appeals to transnational authority. Though the terms of just war theory are well known, it may help to restate briefly the basic guidelines before jumping into the specific exatnple of their application in Israel,
Judging War
Just War Theory offers a particular vocabulary for the question of how we judge a war. There are two aspects of war which are judged.M ichael Walzer tells us:
War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: we say that war is being fought justly or unjustly. Jus ad bellum. the justice of \yar, andyuv in bello, justice in war, point to deep issues. The ftrst requires us to make judgments about aggression and self-defense; the second about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement (Walzer 1977:21) ,
This fust judgment is reached afler analyzing the reasons for and intentions behind starting a war and the authority of the state to make such a decision. The second judgment, about the rules ofwar, focuses on questions of noncombatant itninunity and proportionality.
Examples of just wars include, most classically, wars of selfdefense. But this group of wars has been expanded to include pre-emptive strikes against states posing imminent threats. But using war fighting as a response to a threat is not automatically blessed: Stanley Hoffinan has noted that 'if the threats can be handled effectively, without resort to force, war is not morally acceptable' (Hodman 1981: 152).
'Nondefensive wars' are an even trickier moral category in just war theory. The 'right' or 'rightness' of intervention on behalf of a state suffering fiom armed external aggression is often broadened to include situations in which a state is attacking a part or population of its own citizens (witness intervention on behalf of the Kurds in northem Iraq). Humanitarian intervention often justifies the use of outside force in cases of genocide or famine (Hoffman 1981: 156) . This rationale has been used in Somalia and Bosnia.
War fighting, 7U5 in bello, involves judgments concerning proportionality and 'double effect' which is, according to Walzer, *a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking non-combatants with the legitimate conduct of military activities.' Walzer reviews some of the qualifications: the bad or evil consequences of a military action may be acceptable if this action is a legitimate act of war, it the evil effect is not one of the ends or means to an end and fmally, if the good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for the evil effect (Walzer 1977: 153). There is a kind of moral arithmetic for calculating collateral damage.
The distance between a reasoned discourse about the proper way to fight and to kill, the reasons upon which we can agree to determine a just war, and the behavior of a soldier in combat could not be greater. Somehow, by placing rules on the soldier's fighting behavior-and justifying his or her mere presence in combat-we seem to bless the situation with reason-or inject reason into the insanity. Soldiers are themselves means to an end. They are generally not considered to be effective if each considers his or her orders against the largest moral questions of war: why arc we here, what are we fighting for, and so on. An order carries with it its own justification. The soldier does, however, carry a code of conduct, one which recognizes the difference between a combatant and a non-combatant; one which sets out-often in very broad terms-the rules of engagement (when a soldier can employ deadly force against an enemy or a perceived threat). There are times when a soldier asks whether his or her actions are in line with the original or initial judgments of the justice of the war or mission in which s/he finds her/himself. Asking these questions may reduce her/liis ctncacy as a soldier, and, in the end, force her/hun to refuse to carry out certain orders. Refusing to follow orders based on an individual's Judgment of the justice of a given military action is not generally recognized-though the IDF docs emphasize a certain need for this type of thinking, and has distributed guidelines (including 'moral' instruction) to its soldiers. This move from theory to action focuses our attention on questions and varieties of conscientious objection.
Conscientious Objection and Selective Refusal
Conscientious objection in its mcst basic form is the 'refusal to participate in the military based upon an opposition to war' (Marcus 1998: 509) . There are two bases for this blanket objection: religious and ethical or secular. Religious objection stems from certain religious groups or traditions 'which eschew military service, violence, and war categorically' (Marcus 1998: 540) . Secular conscientious objectors have generally been pacifists (Marcus 1998: 541) , those who claim, based on their conscience and education, to be opposed to violence in all forms.
Selective refusal is the refusal to participate in a specific military action. Selective objection can apply to or be used by both soldiers and civilians: someone who is to be drafted can claim that, while he does not object to military service, he objects to serving in the particular conflict at hand. Likewise, someone who is already in uniform can become a selective conscientious objector by refusing to participate in a particular campaign or action. Selective objection is usually based on ' v iolations of sLindards of national or international law and bolstered by the inherent definition of a conscientious objection, the appeal to individual conscience' (Marcus 1998: 542) . As with conscientious objection, selective objection can also break down along secular and religious lines.
The most famous case of selective refusal based on religious grounds in the United States is the Gilette decision, argued before the Supreme Court on December 9, 1970, and decided on March 8, 1971 , Gilette refused to be drafted into the armed forces, claiming an exemption as a conscientious objector. The notes of the case explain that 'in support of his unsuccessful request for classification as a conscientious objector, [Gilette] had stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but declared his opposition to American niititary operations in Vietnam, which he characterized as "unjust". [Gilette's] view of his duty to abstain fix>m any involvement in a war seen as unjust is, in his words, "based on a humanist approach to religion," and his personal decision concerning military service was guided by fundamental principles of conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation of human existence.'* The case boils down to two questions: does conscientious objection to a particular war relieve the objector from military service; and, does the limitation of conscientious objector status to only those who object to all war violate the religious clauses of the First Amendment. Commenting on this aspect of the appeal, David Malament notes that 'numerous religions forbid participation in particular wars without teaching pacifism.' Recognizing one tradition's absolute pacifism, but not another's attitude toward just and unjust war 'creates invidious distinctions, rendering grace to some while denying it to others'* Needless to say, Gilette lost both arguments. Objection must be based on 'religious training and belief (ignoring die jurisdiction or authority of a given religious tradition to judge a particular war to be unjust); and it must apply to participation in any war in any form (Malament 1972 : 372-3).
The standard for judging conscientious objection uses a broad understanding of 'religious.' Writing for the Court in a separate decision (Seeger) relating to secular conscientious objection. Justice Clark explained:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression Supreme Being" rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and tielief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that under this construction, Ihe test of tjelief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given tielief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. The price of Occupation is the loss ofthe IDF's human character and the corruption ofthe entire Israeli society.
[We] were issued commands and directives that had nothing to do with the security of our country, and that had the sole purpose of perpetuating our control over the Palestinian people.
The petition concludes with the argument that this 'War ofthe Settlements' is futile anyway, since 'the territories are not Israel, and the settlements are bound to be evacuated in the end.'' 1 hese arguments are not new and they are not revolutionary.
One of the first questions here is whether or not to violate the law, Israel's Basic Law dealing with the Army provides that 'The duty of servmg in the Amiy.,. shall be prescribed by or by virtue of Law' and 'The power to issue instnictions and orders binding in the Army shall be prescribed by or by virtue of Law.'* In other words, the order to report and all subsequent orders issued to the (citizen and) soldier in uniform carr\' the force of law.
The IDF provides its own guidelines for the protection of its values which it inculcates in its soldiers through education in basic training and operational instruction. These include, among others, 'Responsibility: seeing yourself as an active participant in the defense of the state, its citizens and residents'; and Purity of Arms, the use of weapons and force only for the purpose of their mission and only to the necessary extent. IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and force to harm human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do all in their power to avoid causing hami to their lives, bodies, dignity, and property,"* The reservists who signed the petition argue that the acts of war in which they are ordered to participate do not serve the intention or purpose of protecting the state and intentionally involve actions which target an entire population, combatant and non-combatant.
How What if someone shoots at soldiers from the cover of a civilian residence? Does the soldier return fire toward the area if he cannot be certain that civilians are not in the target area? What if the rules of engagement are set so that the soldier may shoot to kill even if he is not certain that his life is in danger? How can he be sure that the person (man, woman, or child) crossing in front of his position is not concealing a belt of explosives meant for him or anyone, civilian or soldier, behind him? Has every precaution been taken to prevent civilian casualties? Has the soldier been issued clear open-fire regulations? These difficult questions, and the seeming impossibility, while serving in the Occupied Territories, of avoiding some of them, is a central component of the case for selective refusal in Israel,
Objection in Israel
In Israel today there are fotu" groups of objectors: religious and secular conscientious objectors, and religious and secular selective objectors, though religious selective conscientious objection has not been particularly well organized as a niovcnwnt. Of these groups, only those who claim conscientious objector status based on religious belief or pacifism are not currently faced with time in military prison. The history of the exemption granted on religious grounds would take us too far afield; religious conscientious objection is as much a political determination as an attempt by the Israeli government to protect the expression of religious freedom,'" Ibr our purposes, I will simply note that in Israel, only conscientious objection based on religious grounds has received a blanket stamp of approval. The group of secular conscientious objectors face a difficult challenge to prove that they object to all fonns of military ser\ Ice (in other words, that they are pacifists). Often, those whose pacifism is suspect are drafted, and when they refuse, are sentenced to repeated tenns of imprisonment in military prisons in an attempt to break their will to object. In the end many of these secular objectors are found unfit to serve-in other words, their conscientious objection is not recognized, but translated into a more functional recognition by the Army that pursuing these teenagers is fruitless. There is an institutional method in place for the testing of claims of pacifism, en route to the possibility of recognizing conscientious objection based on non-religious grotuid. 1 hose who argue tliat they are opposed to the military actions in the Occupied Territories-in other words, selective objectors-have been sent to niilitary prison. They are often treated most harshly by the luililary authorities before some resolutiott of their status is reached, Ihe case that we are exploring involves reservists in the Israeli Army who claim selective conscientious objection. These arc not draft soldiers doing,conipulsory service. Some Israeli men who have completed their compulsory service are called-up annually for one month a year to serve in the Reserves, Often, decisions about selective refusal are decided by individual commanders. The options include persuading the reservist to change his mind, assigning the reservist to a task or location which would not be objectionable to the reservist, or convening a disciplinary hearing. Yoram Peri notes that:
The case-by-case effort to resolve the issue of refusal through various ways without raising public awareness [has] continued for years; it corresponded to the generally informal character of the IDF as well as the modus operandi of the Israeli civil service, Tliis was the antithesis of de Gaulle's famous statement (made during deliberations over the possible legalizsition of conscientious objection in France). "I will accept conscientious objection, but not conscientious objectors," In Israel, objectors were tolerable: objection was the problem (Peri 1993: 151) .
The decision to bring an individual soldier or group .of soldiers to court martial rests with the Military Advocate General. Since the begitming of the 'second Intifada.' some reservists have been brought up on chai^ges for refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories.
The Duty to Disobey
A group of ^Seruvnikim' (refusers) put their case before the Israeli Supreme Court in an unsuccessful attempt to force the Military Advocate General to revoke the punishments imposed on them for their selective refusal. By doing so, they were arguing for the recognition of secular selective refusal. To make their case, they referred to a great many arguments about the justice of the occupation, generally, and of the various specific actions which are a daily part of the routine of occupation. A review of their brief to the Court shows that, first and foremost, they refer to the international conventions which govern war fighting and occupation, citing in the second paragraph of their argument the goal of various international conventions to 'reduc[e] the distress and damages caused to civilians during wartime and foreign occupation' ('Petition': 5). At the same time, the Peti-tioners cite the evolution of hutnan rights in the Israeli judicial system specifically protecting acts of conscietice. This leads tliem to assert that 'they can no longer take part in tasks they were assigned to in tlie Occupied Territories, since such a task is e\ idently illegal, unlawful, and against their moral code' ('Petition': 5-6), The tripartite argument, then, cites international conventions, Israeli law, and the laws of personal conscience (freedom of conscience).
The basic facts of the Occupation that the Petitioners present to the cotirt make the case that the IDF routinely imposes 'collective punishment [on the] civilian population' and, 'even when meant for crucial aims such as combating terror, does severe damage to dozens and hundreds of thousands of civilians innocent of all crimes' ("Petition": 6). I am aware tliat this aspect of the case is often the most contentious for certain audiences to hear, 1 he case made by the Petitioners cites curfews, blockades, closures, demolitions, prevention of access to health care, and the killing and injuring of civilians in an occupied territory. Each argutnent is predicated on violations e\ idenced by the Petitioners from personal experience and from the work of various human rights organizations.
All three sources of objection, international law, Israeli law, and freedom of conscience draw on notions of a 'duty to disobey' which runs headlong into the authority of the military to cotrttnand its soldiers to do its will. Writing in 1967, Michael Walzer explained that 'the duty to disobey arises when obligations incurred in sotiic small group come into conflict with obligations incurred in a larger, more inclusive group, generally the state. The larger society can ahvays recognize the claims of stnaller groups and so relieve their members from the burdens and risks ol" disobedience. Indeed, the historical basis of liberalism is in large part simply a series of such recognitions' (Walzer 1967: 167-168 ). In our case, the structure of the duty to disobey is different from that which Walzer describes, A part of the Petitioners" claim is that obligations to the rules of conduct of an international convention prevent them from fulfilling their obligations to the state," In other words, the obligatiotis to a larger group bring members of the smaller group into conflict with the state.
The violation ot Israeli law cited by the Petitioners refers to protections for disobedietice of illegal orders under both military and civil law. In the Military Code of Conduct, soldiers are not to be held criminally liable for disobeying illegal orders. The Code and the argument made by the Petitioners are tricky or complicated, Fhe Code reads, according to the 'Petition,' that 'a serviceman is obliged to refrain from obeying an evidently illegal order' Thi.s article, they argue, 'does not establish the kind of disobedience to be deemed legal, but the kind of obedience deemed to be illegal" ('Petition': 40). This allows the Petitioners to make their case that the orders issued in relation to the occupation are illegal.
Here, the Petitioners maintain that 'in recent years the Israeli occupation of the territories has turned into a system of collective penalization of [the] civilian population, a system that hardly distinguishes innocents fix)m suspects since the entire population is deemed enemy' ('Petition': 18). Inherent in the situation of serving in the Occupied Territories, they argue, is the 'lack of clear-cut boundaries between operations serving those same evidently illegal ends of prohibited collective punishment, and innocent operations that do not serve that end. Attempt[ing] to distinguish illegitimate missions fh)m the legitimate ones would be in vain' ('Petition': 18). The Petitioners also cite Article 11 of Israel's Basic Law, Human Dignity and Liberty,' which was signed into law in 1994. Iliis article is meant to protect and preserve life, body, dignity, property, privacy, and freedom Though I am not an expert on legal affairs, and certainly not on the evolution of the legal system in Israel, I find an interesting exemption written into this Basic Law. It reads:
There shall be no restriction of rights under this Basic Law held by p)ersons ser\ing in the Israel Defense Forces, the Israel Police, the Prisons Ser\ ice and other security organizations of the State, nor shall such rights be subject to conditions, except by virtue of a law, or by regulation enacted by virtue of a law, and to an extent no greater than is required by the nature and character of the service.
The Petitioners maintain that they are 'constitutionally protected by the right of freedom of conscience' from being forced to 'perpetrate such acts that are exceedingly opposed to their conscience and moral code' ('Petition': 19). The reservists also cite five international conventions which seek to protect freedom of conscience as might pertain to their freedom to refuse service in the Occupied Territories.'Î n a plea to the highest expression of their duty to disobey, the Petitioners invoke the well-known words of Gandhi: The phenomenon of selective conscientious objection would be broader than "full" objection, and would evoke an intense feeling of discrimination "between blood and blood" Moreover, it affects security considerations themselves, since a group of selective objectors would tend to increase in size. Additionally, in a pluralistic society such as ours, recognizing selective conscientious objection may loosen the ties which hold us together as a nation. Yesterday, the objection was against serving in South Lebanon. Today, the objection is against serving in Judea and Samaria Tomorrow, the objection will be against vacating this or that settlement. The army ofthe nation may turn into an army of different groups comprised of \arious units, to each of which it would be conscientiously acceptable to act in certain areas, whereas it would be conscientiously unacceptable to act in others. In a polarized society such as ours, this con-sideration weighs heavily. Furthermore, it becomes difTicult to distinguish between one who claims conscientious objection in good faith and one who, in actualit>, objects to the policy ofthe government or the Knesset, as it is a fine distinction-occasionally an exceedingly fine distinctionbetween objecting to a state policy and between conscientious objection to carry out that policy. The ability to manage an admini.strative system which will act indiscriminatingly and impartially is especially complicated in selective conscientious objection (HC 7622/02, 15-16 Already, though, the impact in Israel of the Sermitik movement has allowed for a greater public discussion ofthe authority ofthe IDF to field soldiers to fight in the way it has deemed necessary. Sara Hetman finds this to be a significant step in the redefmition of citizenship in Israel, one which started in 1982 with demonstrations against the war in Lebanon.'* The war in Lebanon was described by then Prime Minister Begin as a 'war of choice'-this, according to Yoram Peri, 'negated the tradition of fighting only just wars, that is, "wars of no choice'" (Peri 1993: 152) .'" It was seen as 'a "political war," waged as a political instrument, rather than a defensive war aimed at countering a threat to the nation's existence' (Helinan 1999: 51, 56). This judgment about Jus ad bellum, the justice of war, applies to the current situation as well, and how Israelis define an existential threat to the State.
Conclusions
For Helman, the consequences of these various movements cannot be understated. They serve to create 'a new civic space around the sphere of national security, wherein individuals can challenge the practices of the state, empowers them, paving the way for a call to reduce that state's demands of the individual and to institute a new right-selective conscientious objection. This can be summarily stated in the follow ing terms: "because I have the right (D establish what security is. the state cannot recruit me unconditionally for every military activity"' (Helman 1999: 62) . This challenges the State's unconditional authority over security issues, and allows citizen-soldiers to demand greater 'responsibility' from the State in how they may be put to use '^ More important, perhaps, is the growing movement to apply the rule of law of other states and international conventions as a tool against the IDF. Recently, the Israeli government has been forced to respond to one part of the challenge of the 5erM-vnikim, defending IDF ofticers from possible arrest in I urope on charges of human rights violations.'* For the selective conscientious objector, tliis may be of little comfort. But there has been movement in the international human rights community in the direction of the recognition and support of selective conscientious objection.'"' Working from some of the same assumptions as the Sevuvtiikim, many now support those who 'object to a particular conflict based on their opposition to the state's violations of international law' (Marcus 1998: 542) Arguing for a broader right of refusal, Marcus writes that 'respect for the indi\ idual mandates a right of conscientious objection inclusive of selective objectors who base their opposition upon ethics, religion, or violations of international law. This definition is more inclusive and based on the personal beliefs of the objector' (Marcus h)'«: 542). It seems unlikely that it or any other state's military force will allow this rhetoric of individuality and the appeal to international standards and cunventions to translate Into a broad recognition of a right to selective conscientious objection. I he most likely consequence of the Refusenik movement, however, may be, as Helman argues, an expansion of the ability of citizens to challenge certain decisions by the state, and the state's unquestioned ability to justify its militar>' decisions.
Yaron Ezrahi (2005) following Helman, argues that this may shift the proper debate froni ! c rc:ilm of just war theory (a judgment of the just use of force in the continuing conflict). He asks: Ezrahi's comments come in a review of a set of articles on refusal published in the Israeli journal .Alpayim.^VK ai^gument comes down to a disagreement over whether the Rejusenikim were conunitting acts of civil disobedience 'in order to thwart government policy' and so deserve (and should expect) to be ptmished, or, were 'following the dictates of individual cotiscience.' (William James' pragmatic qualification about a difference that makes a difference seetns particularly relevant here.) Ezrahi is himself offended at the prospect of a government involving itself in the 'galling invasion of the individual conscience, as well as the prestmiption of legal experts to detennine what motivation within the individual's private world might serve as a "sufficient condition" for objection.' Chaim Gans, in his piece in Alpayim, rejects the position, advocated by Shiomo Avineri and others, 'according to which moral disobedience is not legitimate because it is impossible to base it on neutral ideological grounds' (Gans 2(X)4: 12, from the Hebrew). The objection to service in the territories, according to Gans, can be founded on a tmiversal or universalistic claim that the continuing occupation of another people is wrong for everyone, not just wrong for those who refuse to serve. While their claim may not be ideologically or politically neutral, Gans at^ues, it is based on the recognition of a universal moral norm: occupation and oppression is wrong. Some versions of objection to the recent withdrawal from Gaza might hold another universal claim altogether, one which tccognizes die transcendence of religious beliefs over political decisions.^' Whether refusal i,s an act of ci\ il disobedience meant to challenge the state politically as a fonn of protest, or an action which rellects a deep moral objection to the policies of the state. selccti\e conscientious objection presents the state and its citizens with a number of difficult legal and moral challenges. Appeals to authority outside of the stale, whether religious or secular, influence both citizenship and the behavior of the govemmeni itself As Israel raises lund,s to defend IDF officers from charges of human rights violations in the United Kingdom, it may find itself in need of a better defense against those citizens hesitant to be placed in harms way, militarily and legally, ,\i some point in the future it may find itself unable to field soldiers for whom service in the Occupied Territories is prohibited by inviolable secular or religidiis law. And for those \\\w will continue to ai^gue that they cannot abide sci-vice in an army of occupation, an expression sounded in 1968 by Ycshayahu Leibowitz, the moral crisis of an individual conscience rent between obligations to the state and obligations to self, will linger along with die pain of a conscience nurtured and then rejectcil by this democratic society. • I'he basis for this exemption is very different from that common to Christian societies. In negotiations over the status ofthe army in the new >t.ite held with David Ben-Curion, the leader of the Mapai or Lab<.)r party, representatives ot the religious parties requested that yeshiva treligious seminary) students be excused from con,scHption. This request was not iiistiTied in terms ot pacifism, nor was it bom of antimilitary sentiments or of a relksal to learn a military profession. Rather, it was a matter of "preventing neglect ofthe Torah." According to a Jewish tradition of several hundred years, if a young man desires to dedicate his life to religious study, the community mast alUnv him to do so' I I'en 1993: 149).
11. Interestingly, Walzer also makes a point to mention that the ot^jector 'is obligated to other men as well as to ideals. Indeed, to think ofthe etfect of his aitioiLS upon the ideal he once espoused which is surely ;i necessary part ot any due process of renunciation or withdrawal, is also to think of its effect upon those who still hold last to that ideal' (Walzer l%7: 165). In the Israeli case, the most immediate pressure a selective objector faces is from the other members ofthe objector's unit. 
